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Abstract- Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data 
In 2017, the Indian Diaspora was one of the biggest in the world. But until the last decade of the 
twentieth century, owing to the limited interest of the successive Indian governments, no regular 
register was maintained for the diaspora population. In 1990s, the accelerated emigration under 
globalization and the growing interests of Indian government to use diaspora as a source of 
political and economic power, raised the need to quantify the size and demarcate the 
geographical and political boundaries of the diaspora. Consequently, from 2001 the Indian 
government started to collect data about its diaspora population from the countries of 
destination. This data often suffers from incomplete coverage, conflicting political interests, and 
methodological nationalism; and provides distorted images of the diaspora. Recently, the 
emergence of ‘UN Global Migration Database’ and ‘Big Data’ create an opportunity to explore 
other aspects of the diaspora population. In this paper, our main objectives are: firstly, to quantify 
the size of diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora 
from available sources; secondly, to explore the role of the UNGMD and Big Data (Facebook) in 
explaining the socio-demographic characteristics and internal diversity of the Indian diaspora; and 
finally, to present the advantages and shortcomings of existing data sources on Indian diaspora 
population. 
Key words: Indian diaspora; National register; UN Global Migration Database; Big Data; Internal 
diversity. 
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1.- Introduction 
The hyper-migration accompanied with the process of globalization at the turn of the new 
millennium has revived the phenomenon of transnational communities and diasporas (Faist 
2010). This revival of interest is not only limited to the demarcation of geopolitical 
boundaries of the diaspora, but also includes the socioeconomic and demographic analysis 
of its population. The increased diaspora engagement was driven by three main sets of 
interests and resources represented by the diasporas i.e. the extraction of material 
resources for economic gain, the creation or maintenance of domestic and international 
political legitimacy, and the utilization of those abroad as a culturo-linguistic resource to be 
used in defining the boundaries of national identity (Waterbury 2010; Barry 2006; Itzigsohn 
2000). Moreover, diasporas also serve in the construction of national myths that are further 
used to legitimize nationalist political agendas and the modes of inclusion and exclusion 
that designate, ‘who’ will have access to political representation and the resources of the 
state and who will not (King and Melvin 1999). To reap the economic and political benefits 
from the diaspora, the origin countries have started to engage with their diaspora 
populations all around the world, claiming them as their goodwill ambassador or tools of 
soft power (Hercog and Siegel 2013; Kugiel 2017). 
                                                        
1 This paper forms a part of the doctoral thesis of the author, “Indian Diaspora to Spain: Demo-Spatial 
Analysis and Neighbourhood Relations”, enrolled in the Demography PH.D. Program in Autonomous 
University of Barcelona (UAB), under the direction of Dr. Andreu Domingo; and the I+D+I project 
Demography, Migrations and New Statistics Frontiers: Big Data, Continuous Population Registers and 
Administrative Records-BIG-GEDEM (CSO2017-85670-R) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, 
Industry and Competitiveness (PI: Andreu Domingo). 
2 Contact: nsingh@ced.uab.es 
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The growing engagements of the countries of origin in their diasporas have created an 
unprecedented demand for accurate, up-to-date and policy-relevant migration data (both 
stock and flow). The administrative and other national statistical records over the diaspora 
population, frequently suffer from poor coverage and are subjected to "methodological 
nationalism" (Faist 2012). They respond to different historical realities and political 
interests of collecting agencies and provide distorted images of the diaspora population 
and territory. The lack of accurate data and the ambiguity in the available statistics are also 
connected to what can be called the “data politics” of the diaspora phenomenon (Sheffer 
2003). Diaspora population can be a source of cooperation or conflict between the parties 
involved in the immigration process i.e. homelands, host governments, and the diasporic 
entities. It makes the counting of the diaspora population a sensitive and politically charged 
issue. Sheffer argues that ‘to some extent the unavailability and inaccuracy of such data are 
neither accidental nor the result of “objective” difficulties in data collection and 
processing… the problem stems from deliberate policies of homelands and host 
governments intended to suppress or falsify information about modern diasporism, that is, 
to conceal its actual impressive magnitude, rapid growth, and emerging significance’ (2003: 
99). The problem of the inaccuracy and unavailability of migration data, force researchers 
and policy makers to look for alternative data sources, which are not affected by the data 
politics, and can be used to explore the actual size and characteristics of different diaspora 
populations all around the world.  
Indian Diaspora, is one of the largest in the world. But owing to the limited interest of the 
successive Indian governments, until the last decade of the twentieth century no regular 
register was maintained for the diaspora population. In 1990s, massive emigration under 
globalization, the neo-liberal shift in Indian economic policies, and the ever-increasing 
desire of Indian government to commodify and categorise its diaspora as a source of 
political and economic power in the global context (Modi and Taylor 2017), raised interest 
in quantifying the size of diaspora population and demarcating its geopolitical boundaries. 
Since 2001, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), have started to collect and publish 
information about overseas Indians on their official website. This data has been collected 
from the countries of destination and often suffers from the political interests of the Indian 
government and the host countries, in including or excluding some members of diaspora 
population, based on the current diplomatic relations.  
The shortcomings of the data collected by the Indian government force us to look for a 
supra-state data register, which is not affected by the data-politics of the Indian 
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government, and quantifies the flow and stock of Indian immigrants settled around the 
world. The United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) collects and harmonises 
migration flow and stock data from all countries, owing to its global coverage, it can be 
used to measure the size and demarcate the geographical boundaries of the Indian 
diaspora. The information collected is limited to the number of people who were born in 
India and are living abroad. It doesn’t provide any information about the socio-
demographic characteristics of the diaspora population. To know about these 
characteristics, we need another data sources that can capture this information. Recently, 
the irruption of Big Data and especially, social media site Facebook has allowed us to 
explore the internal dynamics and diversity of the Indian diaspora population. As the 
Facebook collects data about the active users, it provides us with the most up-to-date 
information of the Indian diaspora.  
Owing to the unavailability of relevant data sources, quantifying the Indian diaspora 
population has remained a very difficult task for the diaspora researchers. In this paper, we 
want to fill this gap in current academic research by applying different data sources that 
captures diaspora population through different ways. Our starting point is that there is no 
single register available that can capture the exact size, internal diversity and geopolitical 
dimensions of the Indian diaspora at any point in time. Hence, to study the expansion and 
internal diversity of the diaspora population, we have to depend on different data sources, 
including national registers, supra-state registers, and Big Data. In this study, our main 
objectives are: first, to analyse and contrast different data sources which can be used to 
measure the size of the Indian diaspora population and demarcate its geopolitical 
boundaries; secondly, to analyse the advantages and shortcomings of these data sources in 
highlighting the dynamics and internal diversity of the Indian diaspora.  
The paper is structured as follows: section 2, presents the theoretical aspects regarding the 
diaspora population. Section 3, shows different images and the diversity of the Indian 
diaspora captured through different sources. Section 4, compares the advantages and 
shortcomings of each data source. And finally, section 5, presents some conclusions.  
 
 
2.- Diaspora: concept and theory 
Etymologically the term ‘Diaspora’ derived from the Greek term diaspeirein, in which dia- 
means ‘across’ and -speirein, means ‘to sow or scatter seeds’. It was first used to describe 
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the conditions of dispersed Jewish communities (Safran 1991). In its initial definition 
diasporas are collectives of individuals who identify themselves, and are identified by 
others as part of an imagined community that has been dispersed (either forced or 
voluntary) from its original homeland to two or more host-countries and that is committed 
to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland (Durham Peters 1999: 23; Demmers 
2007: 9). Safran argues that the term diaspora has been used to define displaced people 
who feel, maintain, invent or revive a connection with a prior home and ‘regard their 
ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their 
descendants would (or should) eventually return (1991: 83). Diaspora is also defined by the 
"role played by collective memory, which transmits both the historical facts that 
precipitated the dispersion and a cultural heritage" (Chaliand and Rageau 1995: 15). Sheffer 
defines modern diasporas as ‘ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting 
in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries 
of origin - their homelands’ (1986: 3).  
In their ‘Atlas des Diasporas’ Chaliand and Rageau utilise four criteria for defining a 
diaspora: forced dispersion, retention of a collective historical and cultural memory of the 
dispersion, the will to transmit a heritage, and the ability of the group to survive over time 
(1991: 14). Based on a variety of social and political contexts, Robin Cohen (1997) proposed 
a typology of diasporas i.e. victim diasporas, labour and imperial diasporas, trade diasporas, 
cultural diasporas, global de-territorialised diasporas. Some scholars argue that diaspora 
enters into a semantic field with other terms and terrains, such as those of exile, migrant, 
immigrant, and globalisation, and transforms into "the exemplary community of the 
transnational moment" (Tölölyan 1991). At present in its wider definition diaspora signifies 
the lives of ‘any group living in displacement’ (Clifford 1994: 310). In his editorial preface to 
the first issue of Diaspora Journal, Tölölyan writes, “the term that once described Jewish, 
Greek, and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that 
includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile-community, 
overseas community, ethnic community” (1991: 3). Vertovec (1997) claims that in recent 
writings diaspora conveys at least three discernible meanings which are: ‘diaspora’ as social 
form, ‘diaspora’ as type of consciousness, and ‘diaspora’ as mode of cultural production. It 
can be used to describe practically any population which is considered ‘deterritorialised’ or 
‘transnational’ and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of 
nation-states or, indeed, span the globe. According to Mishra (1996, 422) diaspora is a 
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product of human imagination, “around which anti-miscegenation narratives of homeland 
are constructed”. 
In the above discussion, we have witnessed the expansion of the term ‘diaspora’ with the 
inclusion of all displaced people in the diaspora population. In an increasingly transnational 
world of floating communities, the migration has not remained unidirectional, and people 
keep on changing their locations frequently, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure the exact size of the diaspora population at certain places and at certain points in 
time. In the Indian context, the lack of a national registers for the emigrants makes it very 
difficult to quantify the emigration flows from the country. The data on diaspora 
populations is collected from destination countries that suffer from data politics (as defined 
by Sheffer, 2003). In this paper, we consider that diaspora population includes all 
individuals who live out of their country of birth and maintain links with their homeland and 
the diaspora territory is the land appropriated by the diaspora population.  
 
 
3.- The evolution of the Indian Diaspora 
The Indian diaspora is a result of a two centuries’-long history of emigration from India. This 
evolutionary history can be divided into four periods:  
 
3.1.- Colonial Period (1833-1947) 
After the abolishment of slavery by England in 1833, to fulfil the demand of workers at 
sugar plantations, millions of Indian workers were sent to several British, French, Dutch and 
Danish colonies to work as indentured labour (Lal 1996), which is often described as 
another form of slavery (Tinker 1993). Tinker (1993) provides three distinct patterns of the 
Indian emigration during the colonial era: 1) Indentured labour emigration mainly from 
north and central India, 2) Kangani or maistry labor migration mainly Tamil families from 
south India, and 3) passage or free emigration (as cited in Kumar 1999, 7). Along with 
labour emigration, following the routes established by the British officials, a large number 
of Indian professionals (civil servants, craftsmen, carpenters, ironsmiths and armed forces) 
and traders (like Sindhis and Punjabis) also migrated to South-East Asia, North-Eastern 
Africa, North America and Europe (Tinker 1990). During the colonial era, the India diaspora 
extended from Fiji in the East to the West Indian colonies in the West (Khadria 2001). 
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During this period, the Indian government –appointed of British officials- treated the 
diaspora as a reservoir of cheap, docile, and dependable labour, especially to work on 
plantations (Tinker 1993; Tharoor 2017). Hence, the first official records available about the 
evolution of the Indian Diaspora consists of the boarding registers of the Indentured 
labourers, who were transported from the Indian ports of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras to 
several British, French and Dutch colonies, during the period of 1834 to 1920. According to 
Lal (2006), more than 1.5 million Indians had been shipped to colonies in the Caribbean, 
Africa, Asia, and Oceania. 
 
3.2.- Post Independence period (1947-1990) 
After the independence and the partition of India in 1947, the UK emerged as the leading 
receptor of Indian immigrants directly from India and from the African colonies after the 
rise of nationalist movements in Uganda and Kenya (Tatla 2005). This immigration 
flourished till the implementation of ‘the 1968 Immigration law’ that prohibited the free 
entrance of commonwealth citizens to the UK (Hepple 1968). On the other side of the 
globe, in the 1970s, the USA and Canada opened immigration visas for highly-skilled 
immigrants from India. It attracted many well-educated Indians and the flow of high-skilled 
migration diverted towards the USA (Khadria et al. 1991). During the same time, with the 
oil-boom in the Middle East, the demand for the manual labour for mega construction 
projects increased sharply, many unskilled or semi-skilled Indians seized the opportunity 
and migrated to the Middle East countries to work on massive construction projects 
(Kapiszewski 2006). During this period, the first major problem regarding the diaspora 
population emerged when the constitution of India and the citizenship law came into force 
in 1951 and 1955, respectively. The newly formed Indian government pushed the diaspora 
away by using the state’s physical boundaries to define the nebulous limits of national 
identity (Argawala 2015). Only those residing within the country’s borders were deemed 
“Indian”. This message aimed to protect the hundreds of thousands of new migrants who 
had left present-day Pakistan to enter present-day India and were viewed with suspicion 
after the partition of independence (Ibíd). The constitution of India considered all those 
people ‘Overseas Indians’, who had not sought Indian citizenship under the Article 8 of the 
Constitution. The overseas Indians were divided into several categories - citizens of the 
country of their adoption; holders of a valid British passport, but without local citizenship 
(e.g. East African Asians); and the people of the stateless category (e.g. Indians Tamils of Sri 
Lanka and the Burmese Indians) (Motwani et al.1993). In the coming four decades (1950-
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1990), the attitude of the Indian government over emigrants was ‘Overseas Indians are 
traitors’, who left their country for economic benefits. It leads to a very inactive policy for 
emigrants in this period (Khadria 2008). 
 
3.3.- India’s neoliberal shift 
In the 1990s, economic neo-liberalization and globalization, fuelled the mass emigration of 
unskilled labour from India to all over the world. The unskilled labour migrated to the Gulf 
countries and Southern Europe, mainly Italy and Spain (Garha and Domingo 2017). While, 
the skilled labour and students start migrating to the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand (Hawthorne 2014; Lu and Hou 2015). During this period, the economic and 
political situation of the Indian diaspora population improved greatly, and the government 
of India start treating the diaspora as ‘global Indian family’ (Vardarajan 2005, 19). The 
contribution of the diaspora community to Indian economic development led to a swift 
change in the Indian government’s perception of its own migrants, applauding their 
achievements with great pride (Hercog and Siegel 2013). The traitors of past decades 
become the ‘angels of development’ (Khadria 2008), a significant “strategic resource” and a 
major tool of India’s “soft power” (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014). They are considered as 
natural goodwill ambassadors, bringing Indian culture, religions, values, cuisine and 
traditions to the farthest corners of the globe and suddenly the forgotten children of 
mother India became a source of pride for the country (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003). In 
1998, the government of India started issuing PIO Cards for the Indians settled in some 
specific countries, promising visa-free travel and privileges in matters of investment and 
education (Singh 2014: 247). In August 2000, the Ministry of External Affairs formed a High 
Level Committee (also known as Singhvi Committee), on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a 
comprehensive study of the characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths 
and weaknesses of the Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. Following the 
recommendations of the Singhvi committee (2001), the government of India started to 
celebrate an annual convention of Overseas Indians-Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD, Day of 
the Overseas Indian). This event has been organized since 2003, with the participation of 
the higherst-level Indian officials (including presidents and prime ministers of India), and 
serves as a platform for discussing key issues concerning members of the global Indian 
diaspora and their links with India (Mani and Varadarajan 2005).  
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In May 2004, a special Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs was established to oversee 
all issues concerning relations with Indian nationals settled abroad. The Ministry was 
renamed as the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in September 2004, with a 
mission to “connect the Indian Diaspora community with its motherland.” Besides dealing 
with all matters relating to overseas Indians, the ministry was engaged in several initiatives 
with Overseas Indians for the promotion of trade and investment, emigration, education, 
culture, health and science and technology. Subsequently, in 2005, the Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh announced that his government would extend dual citizenship to all 
overseas Indians who had migrated out of the country after 26 January 1950, and assured 
the continuance of economic reforms at a greater speed to unleash India's latent potential 
(Singh 2014). In 2006 the government introduced the “Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)” 
scheme, which for the first time in Indian history allows a limited form of dual citizenship 
(without any political rights including right to vote), and gives extra privileges to some 
overseas Indians (mostly settled in the developed world).  
 
3.4.- The period of nationalist revival (2014-present) 
This period is very important for the Indian diaspora population; as the Indian government 
start fostering direct engagement with the diaspora community. Since the new Indian 
government, led by N. Modi, took power in May 2014, several structural reforms have been 
introduced to the existing diaspora engagement policy. Addressing the PBD in 2015, Modi’s 
External Affairs Minister summed up the new diaspora policy in terms of 3 C’s, as the new 
diaspora policy encourages the diaspora to ‘connect’ with India, ‘celebrate’ their cultural 
heritage and ‘contribute’ to the development of the homeland (as cited in Mohan and 
Rishika 2015, 2). Modi and his government wish to make India a vishwaguru and a ‘leading 
power’, but on the whole, as Hindu nationalists -opposed to Congress political ideas and 
policies nurtured by Nehru and Gandhi-, they seek an alternative agenda grounded in the 
Hindu nationalist tradition of thought (Hall, 2015). Some prominent authors like Appadurai 
(2017) claim that Modi ‘advocates Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) as the governing ideology 
of India and… combines extreme cultural nationalism with markedly neoliberal policies and 
projects’, which is at the heart of his diaspora engagement policies. The positive policy 
consequences of Modi’s government are some relaxation in the visa norms for the overseas 
communities, improving physical connectivity and the ease of doing business in India 
(Mohan and Rishika 2015). 
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At present for the Indian government the value of diaspora lies in three fundamental 
aspects: economic, political and soft power. First, economically it is an important source of 
capital for India’s development, in the form of both remittances and foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Secondly, overseas Indians play a crucial role in enhancing political ties 
with other countries, in both formal and informal ways. In non-political circles, in capacities 
as journalists, entrepreneurs, and academicians, they also exert influence on the policy of 
their receiving country regarding issues important for India. Thirdly, the Indian diaspora is 
also an important soft power tool, essential in spreading a positive image of India abroad 
(Kugiel 2017, 120). It is important to note that, although the Indian diaspora is often 
considered as an asset for the country, it can also be a liability and a source of tensions in 
relations with other states e.g. The Indian Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and alleged 
discrimination against them has been a constant point of friction between India and Sri 
Lanka; safety and labour rights of Indian workers in the Gulf States have become a serious 
concern in Indian relations with the region (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014), and most recently 
the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is creating conflicts with neighbors in the region (Ghoshal 
2017). 
 
 
4.- Indian Diaspora through different Data Sources 
As the diaspora population has become a very inclusive category that includes all 
individuals who are displaced from their homeland, to study the Indian diaspora 
population, we have used following data sources that capture and categorise it, based on 
their definition of an ‘Indian immigrant’ and ‘persons of Indian origin’. It is worth 
mentioning that the position of the Indian diaspora in the hierarchy of the global diasporas, 
and the hierarchy of top destinations in the Indian diaspora changes with the change in the 
data source used.  
 
4.1.- Indian government and diaspora 
The government of India does not maintain any permanent register for the emigrant 
population. Hence, to quantify the size of diaspora population it collects the data from the 
host countries. In August 2000, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs formed a High Level 
Committee, on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a comprehensive study of the 
characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of the 
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Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. This was the first time, the Indian 
government formally tried to measure the size and demarcate the territorial dimensions of 
its diaspora. The committee collected information about the diaspora population from 
different countries of destination around the globe. In this data, the diaspora population 
was divided into two legal categories: Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-Resident 
Indians (NRIs). The first category, PIO, are foreign citizens (except for citizens of Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and other countries specified by the Central Government at different time 
intervals), who at any time held an Indian Passport; or has either of his/her parents or 
grandparents or great grandparents (up to fourth generation) born in or permanently 
resident in India as defined in Government of India Act, 1935 and other territories that 
became part of India thereafter provided neither was at any time a citizen of Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan or Sri Lanka; or is a spouse of a citizen of India 
or a person of Indian origin as mentioned before (as cited in Verma 2013). NRI, on the other 
hand, are defined as Indian citizens who are usually residing outside India and hold Indian 
Passports. If PIO are sometimes called “old diaspora”, NRI are viewed as “new diaspora” 
(Gautam 2013). In addition, there are the not so numerous categories of Stateless Persons 
of Indian Origin, which includes people with no official documents to demonstrate their 
Indian origin, mostly based in South Asia, in countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and 
Myanmar (Thussu 2013: 76).  
According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in 2001, the size of the diaspora 
population was 16.7 million individuals, of whom the share of PIO and NRIs was 11.3 million 
and 4.9 million, respectively, and the remaining 0.45 million were stateless persons of 
Indian origin (the majority of whom live in Myanmar). The diaspora population was 
dispersed into 131 countries around the globe. Its biggest share was living in Asia (55.2%), 
followed by North America (15.1%) and Europe (10.6%). In 2017, with the regular 
emigration of skilled and unskilled labour and their family members from India, natural 
growth of the Indian diaspora population, and the statistical recognitions of Indians living in 
the neighbouring countries as PIO, the size of the diaspora population increased to 31.2 
million people, of whom 17.9 million were PIO and 13.3 million were NRIs. They were 
settled in 208 countries around the globe. Similar to 2001, most of them were concentrated 
in Asia (58.7%) and North America (17.6%), which registered an increase of 3.2% and 2.5% 
in total diaspora population, respectively. On the contrary, Europe, Latin America and Africa 
lost their share by 1.2%, 2.1% and 2.4%, respectively (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1.- The territorial distribution of overseas Indians in 2001 and 2017 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India, 2001 and 2017. 
 
In the last two decades, along with population size, the hierarchy of the top destinations 
has also changed. In 2001, Myanmar (2.9 million), the USA (1.7 million) and Malaysia (1.6 
million) were at the top three positions among the first fifteen destinations of the Indian 
diaspora. In 2017, the USA emerged as the leading destination, with more than 4.5 million 
overseas Indians, followed by Saudi Arabia (3.3 million) and Malaysia (3 million). Sri Lanka, 
Nepal and Qatar entered the list of top 15 destinations, while Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana 
and Fiji, which were the destinations of the old diaspora, have lost their places in the top 
fifteen destinations (Fig. 2). It shows the revival of the diaspora population, as the 
destinations of old diaspora are losing their importance and new destinations occupying 
their space in the hierarchy of top destinations. 
While looking at both categories of the Indian diaspora population, we find that in 2001, 
most of the PIO were settled in Myanmar (2.5 million), Malaysia (1.7 million), the USA (1 
million), South Africa (0.9 million) and Mauritius (0.7 million). Except the USA, where most 
of the PIO were naturalized citizens, all other countries have descendants of the immigrants 
who had emigrated (voluntarily or forcefully) from India during the colonial period. This 
situation changed in 2017, now a majority of the PIO were settled in the USA (3.2 million), 
Malaysia (2.8 million), Myanmar (2 million), Sri Lanka (1.6 million) and the UK (1.5 million). 
Papers de Demografia, 462 (2018)                              
12 
As compared to their distribution pattern in 2001, their number multiplied 3 times in the 
USA and almost doubled in Malaysia and the UK, but declined in Myanmar (Fig. 3).  
 
Figure 2.- Top 15 countries of destination in the Indian diaspora, 2001 and 2017 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration, with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), India, 2001 and 2017. 
 
 
Figure 3.- The territorial distribution of PIOs and NRIs, 2001 and 2017 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India, 2001 and 2017. 
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The rise in the number of PIO in the USA, the UK and Malaysia is directly related to the 
naturalization of Indian immigrants who emigrated from India long ago in search of work 
opportunities, while the fall in the number of PIO in Myanmar is caused by the remigration 
of the Indian origin population to other countries like Bangladesh, to escape from the 
discriminatory and hostile policies of the present Myanmar government (Ahsan-Ullah 
2016). The recognition of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka as PIO -who were not included in the 
2001 PIO list owing to the fear of political conflict with the neighbouring country Sri Lanka- 
has increased the size of the diaspora population and added Sri Lanka to the list of major 
destinations. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which have a large number of Indian 
workers, have not even a single PIO. It was due to their citizenship laws that prevent the 
immigrants and their children from becoming naturalized citizens of their resident country 
(De Bel-Air, 2014). 
In 2001, NRIs were mainly settled in Saudi Arabia (1.5 million), the UAE (0.9 million), the 
USA (0.7 million), the UK (0.5 million) and Oman (0.3 million). Of the total NRIs, 63.2% were 
living in the Gulf countries, where the share of PIO was only 0.4%. As compared to 2001, in 
2017, the number of NRIs in Saudi Arabia (3.3 million) and the USA (1.3 million) doubled, 
and in the UAE (2.8 million), Kuwait (0.9 million), Oman (0.8 million) and Qatar (0.7) tripled. 
Except the USA, all other countries are in the Gulf region, where the share of NRIs increased 
to 65.9%, while the share of PIOs reduced to 0.06% (Figure 3). It was mainly due to the 
large-scale immigration of unskilled or semi-skilled labour to the Gulf countries. 
 
4.2.- United Nations Global Migration Database and Indian Diaspora 
In the last three decades (1990- present) under globalization, the size, diversity, distance, 
and intensity of international migration, has multiplied several times (Czaika and de Haas 
2014). The need to study the characteristics of the immigrant population flows and their 
effect on the sending and host countries have created a demand for accurate, up-to-date 
and policy relevant migration data collected by some supra-state agency. In response, the 
United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) has developed the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) in 2006. It is 
a comprehensive collection of empirical data on the number (stock) of international 
migrants by country of birth or citizenship, sex and age as enumerated by population 
censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys and other official 
statistical sources from more than 200 countries and territories around the world.  
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In estimating the international migrant stock, international migrants have been equated 
with the foreign-born population whenever this information is available, which is the case 
in most countries or areas. In the countries lacking data on place of birth, information on 
the country of citizenship was used as the basis for the identification of international 
migrants, thus effectively equating, in these cases, international migrants with foreign 
citizens. Equating international migrants with foreign citizens when estimating the migrant 
stock has an important shortcoming. In countries where citizenship is conferred on the 
basis of jus sanguinis, people who were born in the country of residence may be included in 
the number of international migrants even though they may have never lived abroad. 
Conversely, persons who were born abroad and who naturalized in their country of 
residence are excluded from the stock of international migrants when using citizenship as 
the criterion to define international migrants. Using country of citizenship as the basis for 
the identification of international migrants also has an impact on the age distribution of 
international migrants. In countries where citizenship is conferred mainly on the basis of jus 
sanguinis, children born to international migrants tend to be considered foreign citizens 
and are thus included in the count of international migrants. Conversely, in countries where 
citizenship is conferred mainly on the basis of jus soli, children born to international 
migrants are granted citizenship upon birth and are thus excluded from the migrant stock. 
In relation to the Indian diaspora, owing to its global nature, the UNGMD collects 
information about all Indian nationals and refugees of Indian origin settled around the 
world. It provides information for the period of 1990 to 2017 that allows us to measure the 
evolution of the size of diaspora population and the territorial expansion of the Indian 
Diaspora during the last three decades. According to the UNGMD, in 2017, India has the 
largest diaspora in the world with 16.6 million individuals born in India and living abroad, 
followed by Mexico (13 million), Russian Federation (10.6 million) and China3 (10 million) 
(Fig. 4). 
In 2017, the Indian diaspora was stretched to 130 countries around the globe, in which 
70.9% were settled in Asia, 17.5% in North America and 7.9% in Europe. While, Latin 
America had the least share in the diaspora population i.e. 0.09%. In Asia, the UAE had the 
highest number of Indian immigrants (3.3 million) followed by Saudi Arabia (2.0 million), 
Pakistan (1.9 million), Oman (1.1 million) and Kuwait (1.1 million). In North America, 2.3                                                         
3 As the UNGMD only consider the people who were born in a country and living abroad permanently, it 
puts China at the fourth place, if we include all immigrants and their descendants, then China will be at the 
top in diaspora population with over 35 million people of Chinese origin living abroad. 
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million Indians were settled in the USA and 0.6 million in Canada. In Europe, the UK had the 
largest number of Indian immigrants, i.e. 0.8 million (Fig. 5). 
 
Figure 4.- Top 15 Diasporas (in terms of population size in UNGMD) in the world, 2017 
 
 
Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017. 
 
Figure 5.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of the Indian diaspora in 2017 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017. 
 
If we see the evolution of the Indian diaspora, the last three decades have witnessed an 
enormous increase in the diaspora population. In the 1990s, with the Neo-liberal shift in 
Indian economic policy, the Indian economy was opened to the outer world. It facilitated 
the movement of skilled or unskilled labour to the Western and the Gulf countries. Initially, 
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the size of the diaspora population increased slowly from 6.7 million in 1990 to 7.9 million 
in 2000. But, in the next decades, it grew at a very high rate (7% per annum during 2005-
2010) and reached 16.6 million in 2017. From 1990 to 2017, the share of North America 
and Oceania in the total diaspora population increased by 8% and 1.7%, respectively, that 
of Europe remained constant, and declined in Asia by 10% (Fig. 6a). 
 
Figure 6.- The evolution of the size, growth rate and sex-ratio of Indian diaspora population at continent 
level,1990-2017 
 
   6(a) Size and Growth rate   6(b) Sex Ratio 
  
 
Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990-2017. 
 
This period also witnessed the masculinization of the Indian diaspora population. In 1990, 
the sex ratio was 1.4 males per female and it remained more or less consistent till 2000. But 
in the following decade, due to the increased immigration of male unskilled or semiskilled 
workers to the Gulf countries, the sex ratio increased in the favour of males. In 2017, 
especially in the Gulf countries, like Oman (7.23 male per female), Qatar (6.24), the UAE 
(3.5), Bahrain (3.1), Kuwait (2.6), and Saudi Arabia (2.3), the sex-ratio was considerably 
higher as compared to the developed countries, e.g. the USA (1.1), the UK (1), and Canada 
(1). Nepal (0.4) was the only country in the top 15 destinations, where the sex-ratio was in 
favour of females (Fig. 6b).  
In the year 1990, the top two destinations in the Indian diaspora were Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia. The Indian immigrants in Pakistan were the people who moved to Pakistan after the 
partition of India. The Indian government doesn’t consider them Indians anymore, but the 
Pakistani government and the United Nations commission for refugees still consider them 
refugees from India. Conversely, most of the immigrants to Saudi Arabia were economic 
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migrants who migrated to work on mega construction projects or in the service sector (Fig. 
7a). In 2017, the situation changed and the UAE and the USA occupied the first two places 
shifting Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to third and fourth position. Meanwhile, Kuwait and 
Oman emerged as major destinations for the Indian immigrants. In the developed world 
Canada, Australia and Italy have also shown a considerable increase in diaspora population 
during the last three decades (Fig. 7b). 
 
Figure 7.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the United Nations Global Migration Database, 
1990 and 2017 
 
   7(a) In 1990     7(b) In 2017  
 
 
Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990-2017. 
 
4.3.- Emergence of Big data and Indian Diaspora  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the emergence of social media, cloud computing, and 
processing power through multi-core processors and GPUs, has contributed to the 
emergence of ‘Big Data’ (Manovich 2011; Agneeswaran 2012). Big Data has been seen as a 
source that can capture accelerated demographic phenomena, such as migration, almost in 
real time, leaving population registers and census-like operations outdated (Mayer-
Schonberg and Cukier 2013). At the same time, it changes our perception of population and 
with it the discipline of demography, from the implicit categorization that it realizes, which 
according to some authors, like Han (2017), corresponds to the rupture that neoliberalism 
has imposed in the disciplinary regime of bio-politics, understood as a form of population 
governance (Foucault 1979). The diaspora population has captured the great advantages of 
online spaces and has extensively depended on the internet as a “central means of 
communication” (Kissau & Hunger 2008, 245). Diasporas are collectives of individuals who 
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have been dispersed (either forced or voluntary) from their original homeland; social media 
sites like Facebook, help to reduce the communication gap between ‘dispersed’ community 
members within the diaspora. Social media provides space for sustaining relations and 
connections across distance and across diverse subgroups (Georgiou & Silverstone 2007, 
17).  
Since its creation in February 2004, Facebook with its wide sample range has become a 
powerful research tool for the social sciences in which millions of social interactions are 
played out every day. It has 2.01 billion monthly active users around the world as of June 
30, 2017 and company estimates that it has an average of 1.32 billion daily active users 
(Facebook, 2018). It provides a large and diverse pool of participants, who can be 
selectively recruited for both online and offline studies (Kosinski et al. 2015). As one of the 
most attractive social network sites, Facebook possesses three basic features - profiles, 
friends list, and postings (Boyd 2008). Additionally, it facilitates data collection by storing 
detailed records of its users’ demographic profiles, social interactions, and affiliations.  
In relation to the Indian diaspora, apart from the size of diaspora population and the 
territory occupied by it, Facebook is the only data source that enables us to capture its 
internal diversity. In this study, Facebook’s advertising platform (a freely accessible 
platform created for advertisement purposes) has been used to target the study population 
(in our case Indian diaspora population), with different socio-demographic characteristics 
including age, sex, location, language, ethnicity and citizenship. We have extracted data for 
individuals (13 to 65 + years old), who were born in India and are living in different 
countries of destination. According to the Facebook data, in 2017, the Indian diaspora 
consisted of 12.8 million individuals living in 150 countries around the globe. Their 
territorial distribution was skewed in favour of Asia. Of the total diaspora population 60.7% 
were living in Asia, 20.9% in North America, 10.5% in Europe, 2.5% in Africa, and 0.8% in 
Latin America (Fig. 8). 
In the top 15 destinations, the UAE was on the top with 2.7 million Indians, followed by the 
USA (2.1 million) and Saudi Arabia (0.9 million). In Europe, the UK and Germany, and in 
Asia, neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan were included in the top 
15 destinations. As per the sex composition of the diaspora population, the overall sex-ratio 
was 2.5 males per female, and the highest values were registered in Gulf countries like, 
Saudi Arabia (8.6), Qatar (7.8), Kuwait (7.4), Oman (5.9), and Bahrain (5.2). On the contrary, 
Philippines and Indonesia had the sex-ratio in favour of females i.e. 0.6 and 0.9 males per 
female, respectively (Fig. 9). 
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Figure 8.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of Indian Diaspora (13-65) through Facebook data, 
2017 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with Facebook data, August, 2017. 
 
Figure 9.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the Facebook data, 2017 
 
 
Source: own elaboration, with Facebook data, August, 2017. 
 
Facebook data also provide relevant information about the age structure of the Indian 
diaspora population. In 2017, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia had the highest share of 
young adults (13-24 years) of Indian origin population i.e. 59%, 54% and 45%, respectively. 
On the contrary, the USA, the UK and Canada had the highest share of elderly (50 and 
more), i.e. 17%, 16% and 14%, respectively. It might be due to the long history of 
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immigration to these countries and a better social security system that encourages the 
elderly population to stay in these countries. The highest share of working population (25 
to 49 years) was living in Singapore (81%), Saudi Arabia (78%) and Kuwait (78%) (Fig. 10). 
 
Figure 10.- The age structure of Indian immigrants in 20 top destinations of Indian diaspora 
through Facebook, 2017 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with Facebook data, August, 2017. 
 
The most important contribution of the Facebook data to the study is its potential to reveal 
the internal diversity of the Indian Diaspora population. The native Indian population is 
highly diverse in terms of ethnic origins, languages and religious affiliations (Priya 2016). 
This internal diversity has an enormous impact on the composition of the diaspora 
population. As different ethnic groups seek to maintain their identity and languages in the 
diaspora (Cohen 2004) and it affects their level of integration in the host society, it 
becomes imperative to study this internal diversity. The use of a particular language in a 
foreign context, on the one hand, works as a marker of ethnic identity that binds the 
community, and on the other hand, also shows the connections with the homeland and its 
memories, which are significant characteristics of a diaspora population. In the past, owing 
to the lack of data sources on ethnicity, it was very difficult to explore the internal diversity 
of a diaspora population. Now with the Facebook data on the language used by the users as 
their mother tongue, one can find their ethnic origins in India. In this paper, with the help 
of this data, we have explored the ethno-linguistic diversity of the Indian diaspora.  
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According to the Facebook data, in 2017, the different ethnolinguistic groups were not 
equally represented in the diaspora population as per their share in the total Indian 
population4. Almost half of the Indian population (49.3%) was made up of the Hindi 
speakers, but they were underrepresented in the diaspora population (47.2%). Malayalis, 
Tamils and Punjabis were overrepresented in the diaspora, as their share in the total 
population was 3.8%, 7.1%, and 3.4% and in the diaspora population was 19.6%, 12.3% and 
9.7%, respectively. On the contrary, Bengalis (3.1%), Telugus (5.6%), Gujaratis (2.3%), and 
Kannadas (1.9%) were underrepresented in the diaspora, as they had high share in the total 
Indian population i.e. 9.7%, 8.7%, 5.4% and 4.3%, respectively (Fig. 11).  
 
Figure 11.- The share of different ethno-linguistic groups in the Indian diaspora through Facebook, 
2017, and in India, 2011 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration, the data from Facebook, August 2017 and census of India, 2011. 
 
Among all major ethnolinguistic groups, the Hindis, with 3.8 million individuals, was the 
biggest in India and in the Diaspora. In India, they were mainly concentrated in ten states of 
central and north India i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Delhi. In the diaspora, they 
were settled in more than 100 countries, but their territorial distribution was skewed in 
favour of the Gulf countries, where the UAE (25.6%), Saudi Arabia (12.2%) and Kuwait 
(7.1%) were their major destinations. The remaining 20% were settled in the North 
America, where the USA (13.5%) was their major destination followed by Canada (5.8%).                                                         
4 2011 census of population in India is the most recent source of data on languages, which we used as a 
marker of ethnic origin. In India all major ethnic groups have their own language. 
Papers de Demografia, 462 (2018)                              
22 
The Malayalis was the second largest ethno-linguistic group with 1.7 million individuals 
settled in 44 countries around the globe. They originated from the south Indian state of 
Kerala. 85% of them were settled in Gulf countries, where the UAE (43.7%), Saudi Arabia 
(15.7%), Qatar (9.9%), Oman (8.2%) and Kuwait (7.6%) were their major destinations. A 
small share of Malayalis were also settled in the USA (2.9%). The Tamils was the third 
largest group in the diaspora with 1.1 million people living in 48 countries. They emigrated 
from Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India. They were settled in the UAE (29.8%), 
Singapore (15.4%), Saudi Arabia (10.2%) and the USA (9.3%). The fourth largest group was 
Punjabis, with 0.85 million individuals originated from the northern states of Punjab and 
Haryana, and settled across the world in more than 100 countries. Almost half of their 
population was concentrated in three countries i.e. Canada (18.8%), the UAE (17.6%), and 
the USA (12.9%). The UK, which was their major destination in Europe for several decades, 
had 6.81% share in the total Punjabi diaspora. In Oceania, Australia (9.3%) and New Zealand 
(4%) were emerging as major destinations for Punjabi students and high-skilled workers.  
The Telugu group was in fifth place, with 0.5 million people settled in 36 countries around 
the world. They originated from Andhra Pradesh, a southern state of India. Their major 
destinations were the USA (28.4%), the UAE (22.3%) and Kuwait (14.6%). The Telugu group 
was divided into two subgroups, the highly-skilled part consists of software engineers 
emigrated from Bangalore to Silicon Valley in the USA and the low-skilled workers 
immigrated to the Gulf countries. The Bengalis was the sixth largest group with 0.3 million 
people, living in 54 countries. They emigrated from West Bengal, an eastern state of India. 
The UAE (21.7%), the USA (16.6%) and Saudi Arabia (12.9%) were their major destinations. 
The Gujaratis was the seventh largest group consisted of 0.2 million individuals living in 64 
countries. They originated from the trading communities of Gujarat, a western state of 
India. More than half of them were settled in North America, where the USA (39.9%) was 
their top destination, followed by Canada (10.3%). The UK (9.8%), the UAE (9.3%) and 
Australia (6.9%) were their main destinations in Europe, Asia, and Oceania, respectively. 
The Marathis was the eighth largest group consisted of 0.2 million people settled in 36 
countries. They emigrated from Maharashtra, a western state of India and most of them 
settled in the USA (28.9%) and the UAE (20.3%). The Kannada was the smallest among the 
selected groups with 0.15 million people settled in 32 countries around the globe. They 
originated from Karnataka state of south India, and mainly settled in the UAE (27.6%), the 
USA (17.4%) and Saudi Arabia (12.2%) (Fig. 12). 
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Figure 12.- Internal diversity (ethnic and linguistic groups) of Indian diaspora through Facebook data and 
top destination countries, 2017 
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Source: own elaboration, the data from Facebook, August, 2017. 
 
As per the sex-ratio of different ethnolinguistic groups, all groups had a high share of males 
in their total population. The Tamils had the highest numbers of males per female (7.8) in 
the diaspora population, followed by Malayalis (5.4) and Telugu (5.2). On the contrary, 
Gujaratis and Marathis have the lowest recorded sex-ratio. But here we should take into 
account that the use of Facebook is sensitive to gender bias. Especially, in the low skilled 
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population the use of Facebook is very limited among females. This may be a cause of the 
high male-female sex ratio registered for all groups. 
 
 
5.- Comparison of different Data Sources 
All above mentioned data sources present different size and geopolitical dimension of the 
Indian diaspora. These differences have mainly emerged from the way these data sources 
define ‘Indian immigrant’ and the data politics of collecting agencies. Firstly, the 
government of India categorises the whole diaspora population into two legal categories 
i.e. PIO and NRIs. In which PIO, includes the individuals who are the descendants of Indian 
immigrants (up to fourth generation) or the individuals who migrated long ago and now are 
naturalized citizens of other countries. The initial purpose behind the formulation of this 
category was to give recognition to the persons of Indian origin living in countries like 
Australia, the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, to facilitate 
the free movement of capital and skills to the country. Some authors criticise the double 
standard adopted by the Indian government while giving recognition to the PIO in different 
countries, as it left a huge number of PIO living in neighbouring countries uncounted (Lal 
2006). Later on, on the demand of the population of Indian origin in other countries, this 
category was expanded to include the descendants of the Indian immigrants living in 
several other countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. As per the diaspora 
population, the PIO data captures a large part of it, but the inclusion of all PIO in the 
diaspora population is a matter of debate, as most of them are fully integrated in the host 
societies, and have no contact with or intention to return to their ancestral homeland, 
which are necessary features of the diaspora population.  
The second category ‘NRIs’ is commonly accepted as the diaspora population, as they were 
displaced from their homeland during the last few decades with Indian passport and 
maintain strong contact with their homeland. The only problem related with NRIs is 
regarding the inclusion or exclusion of their children in the diaspora population, who are 
born at their new destinations. These descendants of Indian immigrants have not 
emigrated from India, so their inclusion in the diaspora population is not fully justified. In 
favour of inclusion, we can argue that on the one hand as most of the host countries don’t 
give citizenship (by birth) to the descendants of immigrants, most of them receive Indian 
citizenship and they have the right to be recognized as NRIs. On the other hand, in the 
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countries which grant the right to citizenship to all newborns, children born to the Indian 
immigrants have the right to be recognised as PIO, as one or both of their parents are from 
India. 
The implicit desire of the Indian government behind the creation of these categories was to 
claim right on the whole population of Indian origin living in different parts of world, as its 
diaspora population. The strategy of the Indian government is to present the bigger size of 
the Indian diaspora, to reap the economic benefits from the diaspora population in the 
form of FDIs and use it as a tool of soft power in global politics. Another more explicit goal 
is to promote Indian culture around the world and present it as a vishwaguru, as now the 
Indian diaspora has become a place where the ‘sun never sets’ (Jain 2012). Hence, for them 
in 2017, the size of the diaspora population was 31.2 million people, who were scattered 
around the globe in 208 countries.  
The main purpose of the UNGMD is to quantify the immigrant flow and stock in all 
countries and regions around the globe. As per the Indian diaspora population, it counts all 
individuals who are born in India and living in different countries with a valid Indian 
passport or registered as refugees. Hence, in the countries where the data on immigrants is 
registered on the basis of the ‘place of birth’, this data does not include ‘the descendent of 
the immigrants who born at their new country of residence’ as immigrants; while in the 
countries where the immigration data is collected on the basis of citizenship, all the 
immigrants who have accepted the host citizenship remained uncounted, as they are not 
the citizens of India anymore. As the dispersion of population is the basic prerequisite for 
the diaspora population, and during the initial phase of immigration, immigrants maintain 
strong ties with their homeland, the UNGMD, presents a very accurate size and geopolitical 
dimensions of the new Indian diaspora for the last three decades. As they collect data 
about the recent immigration flow and the immigrant population living in different 
countries, according to them, in 2017 the size of the Indian diaspora population was 16.6 
million individuals, who were settled in 130 countries.  
Finally, Facebook collects information from its active users to use it for commercial 
purposes. In their advertisement platform they provide information about the individuals 
who may be potential customers for different businesses. To target the Indians, Facebook 
uses the category of ‘Indian expats’, which includes all individuals who originated from 
India and living outside the borders of India, irrespective of their political and legal status in 
the host countries. The Facebook data is constantly changing with its active users and not 
affected by the data politics of the nations involved. Hence, it presents up-to-date accurate 
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size and spatial distribution of the diaspora population. According to Facebook data, in 
August 2017, the size of the Indian diaspora population was 12.9 million individuals living in 
150 countries around the world. This low count on Facebook as compared to other sources, 
is mainly due to the absence of children below 13 years of age, as they are not permitted to 
have a Facebook account (Fig. 13). 
 
 
Figure 13.- A comparison of the size and continental distribution of the Indian diaspora population 
through different data sources in 2017 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from MIOA, India, Facebook and UNGMD, 2017. 
 
All the above mentioned data sources have some benefits and limitations (Table 1). The 
data provided by the MOIA is reliable, as it is collected and published by Indian government 
agencies. It is the only official source, which is annually updated, and provides a long series 
of data from 2001 to 2017. It allows exploring the evolution of the Indian diaspora 
population in the last 17 years and makes a temporal comparison possible. The major 
shortcomings of this data source are: the lack of information about the demographic profile 
and socioeconomic status of the diaspora population; and limited information is available 
about the PIO or NRIs living in neighbouring countries. Secondly, the UNGMD is also a 
widely accepted good quality data source on global migration stock and flow, prepared by 
the UN agencies. Apart from the size and geographical distribution of the immigrant 
population, it also provides information about their sex composition and age structure. It is 
annually updated and temporal comparison is possible. The data is available from 1990 to 
2017. But it has some shortcomings also, firstly, the data on the flow is not available for all 
countries, secondly, no information is available regarding the age structure of immigrants 
from the countries of origin. Thirdly, with reference to the Indian diaspora, it does not 
collect information about the PIO, who makes up a majority in the diaspora population. 
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Finally, the Facebook data includes self-reported information about the nationality and 
place of residence and ethnolinguistic affiliations, which helps in studying the internal 
diversity of the diaspora communities. Secondly, the data is of active users and constantly 
updated by the Facebook, so it provides up-to-date information about the diaspora 
community around the globe. However, a major challenge in studying observational data is 
to draw conclusions that are acceptably free from influences by overt biases. Secondly, the 
quality of Facebook profile data may be affected by user-induced biases typical for self-
reports, such as social desirability and intentional misrepresentation. And lastly, the lack of 
information about children below 13 years of age left a big portion of the diaspora 
population unregistered. 
 
 
Table 1.- The advantages and shortcomings of different data sources used to quantify the size and 
demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
6.- Conclusion 
In this paper we have used three sources to quantify the diaspora population and 
demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian Diaspora, which are under a constant 
restructuring with new migratory flows and changing categories of the immigrants 
involved. These sources inform us about the mixture of migratory movements that 
contributed to the formation of the diaspora, classified firstly, on the basis of typology, like 
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forced migration, economic migration, family regrouping and student migration; secondly, 
on the basis of immigration causes, like with the push factors of expulsion and the pull 
factors of corresponding attractions; and finally, with respect to the resulting populations, 
which include the social and demographic reproduction of heterogeneous groups of 
individuals, grouped under different ethnic and social categories.  
The categorization and statistical registration of the diaspora population are two different 
operations, which are related to the bio-political will of the data collecting agencies (Indian 
government, United Nations or Facebook) to give visibility to some populations that, 
otherwise, only depend on self-recognition. In the first case, the Indian Government at the 
turn of new millennium started to collect data about the diaspora population. This 
statistical operation is presented as a measure of a pre-existing reality - the Indian diaspora 
- in a measurable form with an empirical approach. However, it conceals the creative 
aspect of the categorization of the diaspora population into PIO or NRIs, and their 
quantification according to this categorization (the people who are included or excluded in 
one of the categories), and its effect on the resulting cartography of the Indian diaspora. In 
reality, the revival of the Indian government’s interest in the diaspora is mainly fuelled by 
their economic motives, especially, money received in the form of remittances and foreign 
direct investment from the diaspora population. It was at the base of the boom of Indian 
nationalism driven by neoliberal neo-conservatism in India (as stated by Modi and Taylor 
2017).  
Since 2000, the successive Indian government has maintained double standard for its 
diaspora. On the one hand with a nationalist agenda of creating a normative image of India 
as ‘vishwaguru’ and a ‘leading power’, they have glorified the achievements of the diaspora 
population in the western world, as good quality scientists, politicians and artists, to elevate 
their own position in the world. While, on the other hand their attitude regarding the PIO in 
neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Myanmar or Sri Lanka has always been of neglect and 
distrust. In their nationalist agenda these people don’t represent India. Some authors 
criticize that the policies of the Indian government to engage overseas Indians targeted 
primarily the privileged professional-class diaspora working in high-tech jobs in the US and 
Western Europe, and the recent laws regarding PIO specifically excluded citizens of 
neighbouring countries, reflecting fears of inflaming regional tensions (Lall 2003: 122). 
The recent efforts made by the Indian government to visualize the Indian diaspora can be 
linked to the tendency towards ‘extra-territorialisation’ of the powers of state (Collyer 
2013), which means integrating emigrants or their descendants into the ideology of the 
Papers de Demografia, 462 (2018)                              
30 
nation that is taking place in many diasporas with the process of globalization (Dumbrava, 
2014). But at the same time it increases tension when ethnic minorities living under foreign 
jurisdiction, subjected to repression (manifested or imagined) due to their ethnic 
differences, start claiming rights on their original homeland (Joppke 2005). It applies to the 
population of Indian-origin in neighbouring countries who are now in a stateless condition, 
deprived of the citizenship rights in India or their host countries. In sum, the register 
maintained by the Indian government is a tool to satisfy its political interests and a result of 
their choice to present the image of India to the outer world. Additionally, it conceals the 
internal diversity of the Indian diaspora population, which was expelled from their 
homeland by different economic and political factors.  
In the second case, the UNGMD, whose main objective is to capture international migratory 
movements effectively accounts for the flow and stock of the Indian immigrants in different 
countries around the globe. It is far from the classical definition of diaspora, but most 
reliable in terms of the migratory contribution to the diaspora, and allows us to measure 
the change in the diaspora population due to recent flows. The flow data about the Indian 
emigrants is sparsely available as the Indian government doesn’t collect data about the 
emigrants, and due to the irregular nature of immigration most of the receiving countries 
also lack this information. Hence, owing to the lack of the flow data, changes in the stock of 
immigrants have been used to quantify the size of diaspora population and the changes in 
its geopolitical boundaries. The UNGMD collects data about the stock of immigrants from 
all countries on the basis of the place of birth, which is the case in the majority of countries 
or with citizenship in some countries where the information about the birth place is not 
available, hence in most of the countries they don’t collect data about the descendants of 
the Indian immigrants who were born in the new country of residency. It is justifiable from 
their point of view that the children who were born in the diaspora do not have any 
migratory experience. In the second case, where citizenship is used as the criteria to 
categorise the population, all Indians who have accepted the citizenship of host countries 
are excluded from the data. In both situations a large chunk of the Indian population 
remained uncounted, which reduces the Indian diaspora to the stock formed by the recent 
migration from India. The ultimate goal of the UNGMD to create a complete picture of 
global migration flows and immigrants around the world is to large extent foiled by the 
national statistical sources. Firstly, due to the different definitions of immigrant population 
in all countries (like, foreign born or foreign national) and secondly, regarding the diaspora 
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studies it provides no information about the sense of belonging, which is a key argument 
behind the concept of ‘diaspora’. 
Finally, Facebook as a data source is unique in terms of the information it provides about 
the Indian diaspora (their ethnic origins, languages, socio-demographic profile, networks 
and preferences). This information is hard to get from any other source. Despite several 
shortcomings caused by age restrictions, users’ social class and self-reporting bias, it 
provides possibility to explore the ethnolinguistic diversity and socio-demographic profile of 
the Indian diaspora population. The virtual image of the diaspora created by the Facebook 
data is closest to the reality of the diaspora population, as it corresponds to the individual 
users and not a state or supra-state institution that collects it. But from the point of view 
that permits the measurement of migration and transnational movements, it also appears 
as a fundamental part of bio-politics -although here neither descendants nor ancestral 
reference populations are counted as happened with the Indian government’s registers- 
creating populations through the circulation of bio-power and the production of socio-
spatial relationships (Bailey, 2013). In other words, the reproduction of spatial relationships 
is built up through transnational bio-politics. If the measure of the diaspora, especially that 
coming from the official sources of the Indian state, account for the extra-territorialisation 
of the state, those of Facebook remind us of the 'digital re-location' (as explained by Han 
2016) of the population. This relocation beyond the national territories where they reside 
acts as a counterweight to extra territorialisation. Along with the web of expatriates, the 
use of the mother tongue in the diaspora by the Facebook users (both immigrants and their 
descendants) contributes to the creation of a virtual community, which is trying to retain 
the memories of their homeland culture and traditions. 
As the world is changing rapidly and the digital revolution is entering all fields of research, 
in the near future we will witness a dramatic change in diaspora studies also. The spread of 
transport and communication technologies has intensified and accelerated the flow of 
information in the diaspora and connected the individuals who were dispersed in many 
countries for long time. It has energized the diaspora identities. The potential to count all 
movements around the world in a short time is making the geopolitical boundaries of 
diaspora communities more dynamic. It will reduce or, at least, complement the 
importance of population registers, which are often affected by the data politics of the 
collecting agencies. 
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